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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mindful of the applicable authorities, Joshua James Villalpando asserts the district court
erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because the police officers involved in his traffic
stop improperly expanded the purpose of the stop.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court's findings of fact from its Decision and Order Re: Motion
to Suppress, "At about 11 :00 p.m., Officer Tavita Messenger of the Meridian Police Department
was on patrol on Overland Road when he started following a gold Toyota van." (R., p.58.)
Officer Messenger "ran the van's license plates and it did not return to any vehicle at all," and he
"stopped the van for fictitious plates." (R., p.58.) "It was very dark and he carried his flashlight
with him to talk to the driver." (R., p.58.) As the officer approached the van, he saw "many,
many tools including power tools and multiple backpacks in the back of the van." (R., p.58.)
Officer Messenger talked to the driver, Mr. Villalpando, and "asked to see his
identification." (R., p.58.) Mr. Villalpando "said that he did not have a driver's license on him
and that he had no proof of insurance." (R., p.58.) The officer asked Mr. Villalpando about the
plates, and he "said that he had not had time yet to register the van since he had only purchased it
two weeks ago."

(R., p.58.)

Mr. Villalpando "seemed to be very nervous."

(R., p.58.)

Officer Messenger's attention was particularly focused on the tools and backpacks in the back of
the van, and he "was aware that there had been a number of construction site burglaries in the
area" involving the theft of tools. (See R., pp.58-59.) The officer suspected that a crime had
occurred, based on the tools and backpacks, the plates that did not return to the van, and the lack
of a license and proof of insurance. (See R., p.59.) In Officer Messenger's experience, "people
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who are involved in burglaries often make an effort to make it difficult to identify their vehicles
including using fictitious plates." (R., p.59.)
The district court found that Officer Messenger radioed for a K-9 officer early in the
encounter. (R., p.59.) Another officer, Officer Mo, arrived while Officer Messenger was talking
to Mr. Villalpando. (R., p.59.) Officer Messenger asked Mr. Villalpando "to exit the vehicle so
that he could check the vehicle identification numbers (VIN) on the dash and the door to see if
the vehicle had been stolen." (R., p.59.) The officer's training was to check the VIN on both the
dash and on another place on the vehicle, "a common practice for police officers in order to
confirm if a vehicle has been stolen." (R., p.59.)
Officer Messenger had Mr. Villalpando "step out and shined his flashlight on the driver's
door for the second VIN number." (R., p.59.) Officer Mo was standing by Mr. Villalpando, and
yelled when Mr. Villalpando began moving towards the van. (R., p.59.) As a result of that
"obviously unexpected movement," Officer Messenger directed Mr. Villalpando to sit down.
(R., p.59.) "Officer Messenger then explained what he was doing and why he was checking the

VIN .... " (R., p.59.)
Mr. Villalpando "then said he did have an ID and had just been in Florida for a couple
months."

(R., p.59.)

Officer Messenger got verbal identifying information from

Mr. Villalpando, who also "launched into a story of buying the car from a man who was in jail
and paying for it by putting $500.00 on the seller's books in exchange for the car." (R., p.59.)
The district court found that "Officer Messenger's suspicions grew as the encounter continued."
(R., p.59.)
While Officer Messenger was talking to Mr. Villalpando about his license and the van
purchase, and trying to tie down his identification information, a K-9 officer arrived. (R., p.59.)
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Officer Messenger continued to talk with Mr. Villalpando, "to clarify information about the
license plate and the sale of the vehicle." (R., p.59.) "He also asked questions to see why there
were so many tools and so many backpacks in the back of the van."

(R., p.59.)

Mr. Villalpando's "explanation that he was a plumber only partly alleviated his concerns because
the amount of tools and multiple backpacks was still suspicious." (R., p.59.)
About ten minutes into the encounter, Officer Messenger went to his patrol car and spent
about seven minutes working on his computer. (R., pp.59-60.) The officer ran the VINs and
tried to track down the vehicle title, identify the owner of the van, and fmd out about the
fictitious plates. (R., p.60.) The district court found, "This type of check takes a particularly
long time because of the number of records being sought." (R., p.60.) At one point, "Two
photos of two very different men slowly scrolled up the screen." (R., p.60.) Officer Messenger
did run the VINs and Mr. Villalpando's name, but "[t]he license plate was never associated with
any vehicle at all." (R., p.60.)
The district court found that, about nineteen minutes after Officer Messenger activated
his body camera, the K-9 officer told him the dog had alerted on the van. (See R., p.60.) About
a minute before that, Officer Messenger had Mr. Villalpando confirm his Social Security
number. (See R., p.60.) "Officer Messenger told him that his Idaho driver's license was still
valid and the most recent registration of the vehicle showed it was registered to [him], but it was
never determined where the vehicle was titled." (R., p.60.) The officers told Mr. Villalpando
about the discovery of drugs, and then arrested him. (See R., p.60.) Officers later obtained a
search warrant for the van and found stolen checks and tools inside. (See R., p.60.)
The State charged Mr. Villalpando with felony possession of heroin, possession of
methamphetamine, and grand theft by possession of stolen property, as well as misdemeanor

3

petit theft by possession of stolen property, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (See R., pp.23-25.) Mr. Villalpando pleaded not guilty to the charges. (R., p.29.)
Mr. Villalpando filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, requesting the district court
"suppress any and all evidence," including his statements, "on the grounds that it was illegally
obtained without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution." (R., pp.30-31.) He also filed a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence. (R., pp.32-40.) In the memorandum,
Mr. Villalpando asserted that "Officer Messenger first stopped diligently pursuing the initial
purpose of the stop-a traffic infraction-when he took an extra 45 seconds out of his
investigation to do nothing but shine a flashlight against the windows of [Mr. Villalpando's] van
to attempt to see what was inside." (R., p.37.)
Additionally, Mr. Villalpando asserted, "Officer Messenger then went further to go inside
the van without any reasonable suspicion or consent by opening the driver's door." (R., p.37.)
While the officer "indicated he was looking at the VIN on the door seam," he "had already been
able to clearly obtain a VIN from the dash by looking through the front windshield." (R., p.37.)
Mr. Villalpando asserted the door "remained open and exposed for approximately 20 seconds
and information was taken from inside without legal justification or a warrant." (R., p.37.)
Mr. Villalpando also asserted the initial stop was "further expanded" while
Officer Messenger was speaking with him on the sidewalk.

(R., p.37.)

He asserted that

Officer Messenger did not "immediately attempt to obtain identifying information" from him,
but rather the officer and Officer Mo spent about one-and-one-half minutes telling him "why
they believe they are allowed to open his door and gather otherwise concealed information from
his car." (R., pp.37-38.)
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Further, Mr. Villalpando asserted that, after Officer Messenger obtained identifying
information from him, he continued to question him "outside the traffic investigation scope."
(R., p.38.)

He asserted that, after Officer Messenger made it clear he had obtained the

information needed for a records check, he questioned Mr. Villalpando on his job, whether that
work was better in Idaho or Florida, and Mr. Villalpando's schooling.

(See R., p.38.)

Mr. Villalpando asserted, "None of this employment/schooling information is written down,
showing its unnecessity for the officer in running a records check or furthering any part of the
traffic investigation."

(R., p.38.)

He asserted, "This unnecessary questioning lasts for

approximately 35 seconds, thus extending the length of the stop outside the initial traffic
purpose." (R., p.38.)
Mr. Villalpando asserted that the above abandonments of the purpose of the traffic stop
amounted to a cumulative total duration of about two-and-a-half minutes. (See R., p.38.) He
asserted, "The United States Supreme Court made clear in [Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
348 (2015)], that even a delay for a de minimis period of time constitutes an unlawful detention
and violation of the Fourth Amendment." (R., pp.38-39.) "Officer Messenger exceeded the time
necessary to effectuate his investigation related to the initial traffic stop and instead expanded the
stop's purpose to significantly look inside windows of the car, open a driver's door and obtain
evidence, and gather unnecessary evidence from" Mr. Villalpando.

(R., p.39.)

Thus, he

asserted, "the originally justified stop became an unlawful search and seizure, and any and all
evidence discovered as a result, including that related to any later obtained search warrant, is
fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed." (R., p.39.)
The State filed a State's Objection and Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion
to Suppress." (R., pp.41-46.) The district court then conducted a hearing on the motion to
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suppress, where Officer Messenger testified. (See generally Tr. 4/15/19.) The district court
admitted into evidence footage from Officer Messenger's body camera.

(State's Ex. 2; see

Tr. 4/15/19, p.43, L.19 - p.44, L.4.)
The district court later issued its Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.5866.)

The district court determined, "The van was properly stopped for fictitious plates."

(R., p.62.) After reciting the facts, the district court also determined, "This was a stop which
quickly evolved from concern about a fictitious license plate to concern about the possible theft
of the vehicle and involvement in construction site burglaries." (See R., pp.62-63.) The district
court determined that Officer Messenger "detailed his reasonable, articulable suspicions about
the criminal activity he believed was occurring and took reasonable steps to dispel or, in this
case, to confirm those suspicions." (R., p.63.)
While Mr. Villalpando "challenges the length of the stop and contends that it was
impermissibly extended," the district court determined, "the length of the stop was due to the
complexity of trying to track down the vehicle ownership, the defendant's driver's license and to
determine key facts." (R., p.63.) The district court determined that confusion was caused by
Mr. Villalpando's "words and actions." (R., p.63.)
The district court determined, "Because of the particular circumstances of this case, it
was necessary to engage in a fairly extensive records check." (R., p.65.) Per the district court:
"The duration of the stop was directly related to Officer Messenger's reasonable, articulable and
articulated suspicion that he was dealing with criminal activity beyond just fictitious plates. The
stop, of necessity, took more time. It was not unduly prolonged and its purpose was never
abandoned." (R., p.65.) The district court determined that, as soon as Officer Messenger looked
into the van and saw "all the tools and the multiple backpacks the focus justifiably shifted to
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investigating criminal activity by" Mr. Villalpando. (R., p.65.) The district court determined
that officers examined vehicles they approach at night for safety reasons, and the officer here had
a good view of the inside of the van when he was at the driver's side door to request
Mr. Villalpando's driver's license and key documents. (See R., p.65.) Also, the district court
determined that the investigation slowed down when Mr. Villalpando did not produce that
information, and the K-9 arrived while Officer Messenger was checking on the van's ownership.
(See R., p.65.)
The district court determined, "The initial purpose of the stop was not merely to write a
ticket for a traffic offense as in [State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605 (2016)], but to determine why the
van had plates that were not registered to it-and in fact, to any other vehicle." (R., p.65.) Next,
the district court determined, "While Officer Messenger was running the records check on the
defendant and the VIN, the K-9 alerted, which provided probable cause to search the vehicle for
narcotics." (R., p.66.) The district court determined that "[t]he dog sniff occurred during the
valid detention period," and "[t]he stop in this case was not impermissibly extended." (R., p.66.)
Thus, the district court denied Mr. Villalpando's motion to suppress. (R., p.66.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement preserving his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress, Mr. Villalpando agreed to plead guilty to the two felony possession of a
controlled substance counts, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. (R., pp.6776.)

The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed,

suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Villalpando on supervised probation for a period of
seven years. (R., pp.82-87.)
Mr. Villalpando filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction, Order Suspending Sentence, and Order of Probation. (R., pp.88-90.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Villalpando's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Villalpando's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mindful of the applicable authorities, Mr. Villalpando asserts the district court erred

when it denied his motion to suppress, because the officers involved in his traffic stop
improperly expanded the purpose of the stop. Specifically, Officer Messenger's unnecessary
questioning of Mr. Villalpando after obtaining identifying information from him extended the
stop outside its initial purpose.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found." State v. Moore, 164 Idaho 379, 381 (2018).

C.

The Officers Involved In Mr. Villalpando's Traffic Stop Improperly Expanded The
Purpose Of The Stop
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 1 "This guarantee has been incorporated through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 810 (2009) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).

1

"Evidence obtained in

Mr. Villalpando also asserted his rights under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution had been
violated, but he did not articulate why the Idaho Constitution would be more protective than the
Fourth Amendment in this context. (See, e.g., R., p.30.)
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violation of the amendment generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the
illegal government action." Id. at 810-11. "When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the
grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the
burden of proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. at 811.
"Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012).

"The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness

requirement has been held to apply to brief investigatory detentions." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). "To determine whether such seizures are reasonable, courts first
ask 'whether the officer's action was justified at its inception."' Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
19-20).

"Next, they consider whether the action 'was reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 19-20).
"[L]imited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible
when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime." Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,498 (1983)). "Reasonable
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be
drawn from those facts." Id. "The United States Supreme Court has plainly established that a
traffic stop is a seizure, but it is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment so
long as there is a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws."
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609 (2016).

"A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation."
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). The United States Supreme Court in
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Rodriguez also held, "the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure's 'mission'-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop,
and attend to related safety concerns." Id. (citations omitted). "Authority for the seizure thus
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed."
Id. The Rodriguez Court held, "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for

which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Id.
at 350.
Interpreting Rodriguez, the Idaho Supreme Court in Linze held: "The stop remains a
reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to which that
reasonable suspicion is related. However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the
officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions." Linze, 161 Idaho
at 609. "Indeed, when an officer abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all
intents and purposes initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." Id. The Linze Court held, "This new seizure
cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of the original seizure." Id. "In other words, unless
some new reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the seizure's new purpose, a
seized party's Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original purpose of the stop is
abandoned (unless that abandonment falls within some established exception)." Id.
As for new reasonable suspicion, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held, "The purpose of a
stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the stop is initiated, for during the course
of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which initially
prompted the stop." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v.
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362 (Ct. App. 2000)). "[T]he length and scope of the stop may be
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lawfully expanded if the detaining officer can 'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."'

Id.

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
Mindful of the above authorities, Mr. Villalpando asserts the officers involved in his
traffic stop improperly expanded the purpose of the stop.

Specifically, Officer Messenger's

unnecessary questioning of Mr. Villalpando after obtaining identifying information from him
extended the stop outside its initial purpose. As Mr. Villalpando asserted before the district
court, "after Officer Messenger obtains identifying information from" him, the officer continued
questioning him "outside the traffic investigation scope." (See R., p.38.) Officer Messenger
made it "clear that he has obtained the information he needs for his records check by saying
'perfect' and putting his pen and paper pad away." (See R., p.38.) Only afterwards did the
officer question Mr. Villalpando on his job, whether that work was better in Idaho or Florida,
and Mr. Villalpando's schooling. (See R., p.38.) As Mr. Villalpando asserted before the district
court, "None of this employment/schooling information is written down," showing it was
unnecessary "for the officer in running a records check or furthering any part of the traffic
investigation."

(See R., p.38.)

This unnecessary questioning lasted "for approximately 35

seconds, thus extending the length of the stop outside the initial traffic purpose." (See R., p.38.)
The officers here therefore improperly expanded the purpose of Mr. Villalpando's traffic
stop. This extension of the length of the stop violated Mr. Villalpando's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; Linze, 161 Idaho at
609. Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Villalpando's motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Villalpando respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's judgment of conviction and probation order, and reverse the order which denied
his motion to suppress.
DATED this 20 th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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